Irish Communication Review
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 1

January 1995

Thatcher, the IBA and Death on the Rock
Tony Fleck

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/icr
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons

Recommended Citation
Fleck, Tony (1995) "Thatcher, the IBA and Death on the Rock," Irish Communication Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1,
Article 1.
doi:10.21427/D7K12K
Available at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/icr/vol5/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Current Publications at ARROW@TU Dublin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Irish Communication
Review by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU
Dublin. For more information, please contact
arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

VOL 51995

Thatcher, the IBA
and 'Death on the Rock'
Tony Fleck

Introduction
Since its beginnings in the 1920s. broadcasting in these islands has always been
considered by the vartous governments of the day. whatever their political complexion.
to be too important to be left solely to the broadcasters. Successive administrations have
attempted to regulate and control what is heard or seen over the airWaves by a series of
acts of the British Parliament or Dail E!reann. These acts have been drafted so as to give
designated ministers the power to decide on the composition and membership of the
Authorities. Boards of Governors or Commissions established by law - and to dismiss
them if deemed necessary as happened in the Republic in 1972 under a Fianna Fail
government - to set the parameters of what may or may not be broadcast and effectually
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exert financial control over the broadcasters, a control t hat can have:: a dc::cisive

influence. Government power does not however end here, for there are the many formal
and informal contacts between ministers and senior civil servants and the Directors
General. Programme Controllers and editors that make up the higher echelons of the
broadcasting organizations.
These contacts may come in the form of face to face confrontations but more often
they consist of letters. formal and informal. discreet telephone calls or seemingly casual
conversations at receptions or other public gatherings. for they all tend to be part of the
same social mileu. There may be critical statements made in the privileged atmosphere
of the Houses of Parliament or Leinster House. or interviews given by ministers to the
press or on radio or television, while papers sympathetic to the government may rally in
s upport to denounce the broadcasters and attempt to slant public opinion. In Britain
there is also an even more subtle form of influence on senior broadcasters. what
Douglas Gageby has termed 'velvet glove control'. that is the distribution of honours and
knightshoods. It is no mere coincidence that the only two Directors General, one of the
BBC and the other of the Independent Authority. not knighted were Alasdair Milne. who
was in charge - or not. depending on your point of view - of the BBC during the Real
Lives' crisis. and John Whitney. senior executive of the IBA when Death on the Rock was
broadcast, two programmes that were anathema to the Thatcher government. In 1988.
when Death on the Rock was transmitted by the l'IV network including Ulster Television.
I was in charge of the Belfast Office of the IBA responsible to the Director General, John
Whitney. for the day-to-day working of the system in Northern Ireland. I also had the
responsibility. unique among my eight Regional Officer colleagues. of being consulted by
right before the transmission of any lTV or Channel 4 programme concerning the
troubled situation in Northern Ireland. The Authority itself worked to
lhe Broadcasting Act. 1981 - a copy of which I kept at hand in my desk- which
stated inter alia:
(a)
that nothing is Included in programmes which offends against good
taste or decency or is likely to encourage or Incite to crime or lead to civil
disorder or to be offensive to public feeling:
and
that due impartia.l!ty Is preserved on the part of the person providing
the programmes as respects matters of poliUcal or industrial controversy or
relating lo current public policy.

(f)
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Broadcasters in the North are also subject to the law of the l:md and also to the
various laws enacted specifically for Northern Ireland: the Prevention of Terrorism Act
Northern Ireland 1974, the Emergency Provisions Act and the Criminal Law Act (NI)
1967 which in Section 5:
Imposes a duty to give a constable information which is likely to
secure or assist in securing the apprehension of any person who has
committed an arrestable offence.
In addition, the IBA also published and distributed to all 11V companies and to Channel
4 a set of 'Television Programme Guidelines· which in Section 8. 1(i) under the heading
'Interviews with people who use or advocate violence or other criminal measures' stated:
Any plans for a programme item which explores and exposes the
views of people who within the British Isles use or advocate violence
or other criminal measures for the achievement of political ends
must be referred to the IBA before any arrangements for filming or
video-taping are made. A producer should therefore not plan to
interview members of proscribed organisations, for example.
members of the Provisional IRA or other paramiJitary organizations.
wilhout previous discussion with his/her company's top
management. The management. if they think the item may be
justified. will then consult the TBA.
It was against this legal framework and the political and terrorist tensions in the
Province that the confrontation between the Thatcher government and the IBA
developed. exacerbated by a concerted onslaught on the integrity of the Authority and
the programme makers, Thames Television. by ministers at the highest level including
the Prime Minister and also an Influential section of the British Press which marched to
Mrs Thatcher's drum. including Murdoch's Sun and Sunday Times a confrontation
which had lasting and serious consequences for all those concerned with broadcasting
In Britain.

Sunday, 6 March 1988
News of the Gibraltar shootings came to Downtown Radio. then Northern Ireland's
only commercial radio station, from the Press Association in the aftemoon. and the next
headlines at 4.00 p.m. led with the story: 'Three people have been shot dead in
Gibraltar. It is believed they were irish. Army bomb experts have been called in lo
examine a huge car bomb found at the scene.' Within the next hour. Sinn Fein's Press
Office had Issued a statement saying that the three people killed were members of an
IRA active service unit. By 4.55 pm Downtown Radio news was reporting that the car in
Gibraltar had been examined a nd did not contain explosives but that security forces
were now looking for a second car. The three killed were later identified as Mairead
Farrell, Sean Savage and Daniel McCann. while on Tuesday. 8 March Spanish police did
find a car parked with 64kg of Semtex explosives. detonating equipment and 2kg
of ammunition.

Monday, 7 March
To an expectant House of Commons, the then Foreign Secretary. Sir Geoffrey Howe
reported that the Gibraltar shootings had prevented 'A dreadful terrorist act'. He also
stated that when challenged the terrorists had 'made movements which led the military
personnel operating In support of the Gibraltar police to conclude that their own lives
and the lives of others were under threat. In the light of this response. they were shot.
Those shot were subsequently found not to have been carrying arms.· In answer to a
question from George Robertson. the then Labour Deputy Foreign Affairs Spokesman,
Sir Geoffrey went on:
2
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As I have said, the three people concerned were approached by military people

operating in support of the Gibraltar police. They were challenged at that time.
and the movement that they then made led the military personnel to conclude
that their own Jives and the Jives of others were under threat. The matter. of
course. will be subject to fu rther ampl!fication as further evidence becomes
available. but I have given the House the full extent of my Information
at present. 2
As we now know. and as Death on the Rock was to attempt to show. there was further

Information which the Home Secretary did not have to hand and which threw
considerable doubt on his original statement.

Monday, 14 March
After a delay in Gibraltar before the local Coroner released the bodies. the three IRA
volunteers were flown into Dublin airport some 100 miles from their homes and not into
Aldergrove airport only 15 or so miles from Belfast. This facilitated the Provisional IRA
and Sinn Fein to stage a remarkable funeral cavalcade - fully covered by the television
cameras - which passed through towns and villages draped with black flags and
witnessed by thousands of sympathlsers and inquisitive sightseers.

Tuesday, 15 March
Jenny McGeever. an RTE reporter. who had interv1ewed Martin McGuinness of Sinn
Fein al Dundalk as the funeral progressed towards the North, was suspended for a
breach of Section 3 1 of the Republic's Broadcasting Authority Act which then prohibited
interv1ews with members of terrorist organisations or their political affiliates - in effect
Provisional Sinn Fein, the INLA. UDA. UVF and UFF. (Later in the month. Ms McGeever
was dismissed by RTE after a disciplinary hearing. The broadcasting ban, Introduced by
Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien in 1976 when he was Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in the
Cosgrave/Corish coalition government in the Republic. was suspended in 1994 after the
announcement of the IRA ceasefire.)

Wednesday, 16 March
During the burial of the three IRA volunteers - again fully covered by cameras and
the world's press- three men were shot dead by a lone gunman who had Infiltrated the
crowd and then made a grenade and gun attack on mourners at Milltown Cemetery in
Belfast. Gerry Adams. President of Sinn Fein, promptly accused the pollee and army of
collusion with the attacker. A man. later identified as Michael 'Rambo' Stone- who had
some connection with the Loyalist Ulster Defence Association -was later arrested by the
RUC and subsequently charged and convicted of the murders. He is now In prison.

Saturday, 19 March
The funeral procession of one of the victims of the Milltown shootings, Kevin Brady.
again covered by television cameras. radio and press. was Inexplicably Interrupted by a
car driven by two British army corporals, Corporal Wood and Corporal Howe. both in
civilian clothes. In plain view of the camera, the car was attacked. the men pulled out
and hauled away out of sight. No camera was allowed to follow the men who were
bludgeoned to near death before being s hot. There were attempts by Sinn Fein officials
lo confiscate film and video of what happened but later pictures of the corpses lying
bloody and near naked, one spread out as if crucified, went round the world -as did
shots of a priest attempting mount-to-mouth resuscitation.

3
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Tuesday, 22 March
Despite assurances from the broadcasters that the untrans mitted pictures of the
mobbing of the corporals' car had no value as evidence. ITN, the BBC and RTE were
requested by the RUC to hand over the untransmitted video and film of the attack. They
initially refused. pointing out that to do so would put their reporters in jeopardy. The
Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher, said in the House of Commons.

3.

I believe that everyone. the media included, has a bounden duty to d o
everything he can. to see that those who perpetrated the terrible crimes we
saw on television and that disgusted the whole world are brought to justice.
· Either one is on t h e side of justice in these matters, or one is on the
side of terroris m .3

Hansan:122 March 1988.

Speech by Richard
Dunn to the Royal Society
of Arts. 16 November 1994.
4.

Feelings ran so high that Richard Dunn. then Managing Director of Thames Television
and Acting Chairman of ITN . was accused by ministers of being an ally of the terrorists
and told to his face by irate MPs that the ITN crew s hould have intervened and made a
citizen's arrest.•
In the next two days. under considerable pressure from ~e RUC (John Conway, the
News Editor of the BBC in Northern Ireland was threatened with arrest). and acting on
legal advice- Section 11 of the Preven tion of Terrorism Act 1974 makes it an offense to
withhold without reasonable excuse information of material assistance which would
assist in bringing terrorists to justice- the video and film was given to the police by ITN.
the BBC and the local office of RTE. Michael Checkland. then Director General of the
BBC. staled.
The BBC has never set itself above the law. In dealing with this matter, we
have been concerned with the difficult and dangerous position of our crews in
Northern Ireland... I very much hope that at as a result of this action by the
authorities the BBC's future n ews gathering in th e province will not be
damaged. (Daily Telegraph, 24 March 1988)

5.

Miller (1994: 39-41).

The legality of the RUC's actions was questioned at the time and most recently by
David Miller in his Don't mention the War where he writes. ·... there remains some doubt
as to the applicability of Section 11 to seizing media materials ... the power of the RUC
action was de facto. The power h as still not been tested in the courts.a·

Thursday, 7 April
This Week, a regular and usually authoratlve documentary programme from Thames
Television. was broadcast at 8.30pm. This edition. devoted to a consideration of public
attitudes in Republican West Belfast after the funerals. the s hootings and lynchings.
was previewed earlier lhat afternoon by myself and a colleague from IBA's Television
Division in London. I found the programme depressing as attitudes had not altered;
there was general s upport for the actions of the IRA and Sinn Fein and little contrition a part from a few church-goers a nd the local priest - as to the terrible events
surrounding the d eaths of the two s oldiers. Roger Bolton. the editor of the series and
who had previously worked on the BBC's Panorama.. when questioned informally about
his futu re plans about the Northern Ireland s ituation. told us that h e had a team
working on a detailed examination of the events leading up to the Gibraltar s hootings
and that he had already mentioned this to the IBA's Programme Officer whom he had
met recently at dinner. Next day when I returned to Belfast, I alerted the member of the
Authority with special responsibility for Northern Ireland, who at that time was
Professor J . F. Fulton, Director of the School of Education and Pro-Vice Chancellor of
the Queen 's University of Belfast.
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Tuesday, 26 April
Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. having been told by
his staff of the ma ny enquiries being made by the This Week team and also having seen
the lis ting in 1V Times which said that there would be 'startling new evidence which
challenges previously accepted views·. telephoned Lord Thompson of Monifieth, the
Chairman of the IBA. asking in confidence for a pos tponement of Death on the Rock. as
the Thames' documentary was now called, until after the inquest in Gibraltar into the
deaths of the three IRA volunteers . He gave as his reason for the request that the
contents of the programme might in some way prejudice the result of the Inquest. Lord
Thomson promised to consider what the Foreign Secretary bad said. At this time Lord
Thompson, a formidable political figure In his own right.' had been Chairman of the IBA
for some seven years. He was originally appointed in 1980 Deputy Chairman to Lady
Plowden ,? an equally strong character, during the early months of the Thatcher
administration when the Prime Minister was only testing h er ability to pack statutory
bodies with men and women she judged 'one of us'. He succeeded Lady Plowden in
1981. Thames Television were not Informed of Sir Geoffrey's call. as the Foreign
Secretary had stressed its confidential nature.

6. As George Thomson. h e
h ad b ee n a member o f
Harold Wilson's Cabinet In
the 1960s and subsequently
an EEC Commissioner from
1973- 1977.

7. Lady Brlgtd Hora tia
Plowden Is descended from
the Nelson family which
produced the famous
Admiral whose pillar and
statute once graced
O'Connell Street In Dublin.

Wednesday, 27 April
Death on the Rock, extended from the usual This Week length of about 30 minutes to

nearly 45 minutes, was previewed by senior television staff and myself In London at
lO.OOam. The programme was undubbed in that the commentary, of which we had a full
script, had yet to be added but a U the Interviews were complete. David Glencross, then
Director of Television and now Chief Executive of the IBA's successor body , the
Independent Television Commission, who was on his way to another meellng, said that
we s hould know that Sir Geoffrey Howe had telephoned Lord Th omson the previous
evening asking for a pos tponement of the programme. After closely viewing Death on the
Rock and at times replaying parts of it. we recomm ended that it be transmitted. subject
to three minor changes in the commentary. We felt that it suggested unjustly and
without any evidence. that the coroner's inquest would be unable to establish the truth
and that the evidence given by the police in Gibraltar would be unreliable. Roger Bolton
later accepted both these points bul argued that our third query concerning the Prime
Minister's foreknowl edge of the attack and that s he 'must have had on h er desk details
of how an IRA unit ha d been detected in Spain'8 before the shootings, could be shown to
be true. This latte r poin t was accepted by the IBA and was never subsequently
challenged by the governmen t.
All the staff at the preview felt t hat the progra mme raised serious qu estions
concerning the official version of what had happened In Spain and Gibraltar before and
during the shootings. The !BA then sought legal advice from Counsel representing
Thames that in his opinion Death on the Rock could not be seen as 'contempt of court'.
Later in the day the programme was seen by David Glencross as Director of Television.
John Whitney the then Director General and fmally near midnight by Lord Thomson
himself. (With the exception of Professor Fulton, the other members of the Authority
were not informed nor consulted, as it had previously been agreed in general that in
matters such as this Lord Thomson would use his discretion as to the need for special
meetings of the Authority9 .) It was u nanimously decided that, despite the pleas of the
Foreign Secretary, Death on the Rock should be trans mitted.

Thursday, 28 April
In the morning, David Glencross's office informed the Foreign Secretary's Private
Secretary of the IBA's decision to broadcast the programme and in turn Sir Geoffrey
informed Mrs Thatcher and the Cabinet. Another phone call followed. this time from Sir
Geoffrey to David Glencross. expressing disquiet at the decision and repeating that the

5
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programme might influence the forthcoming inquesl- for which a date had not been set.
For the firsl time Sir Geoffrey raised the question of 'contamination· of evidence and
quoted sections of the Salmon Report of 1969 on the law of contempt as it affects
Tribunals of Inquiry. the key passage reading:
The Press. Television and Radio have always considered that once
any type of tribunal had been appointed it is inappropriate for them
to conduct anything in the nature of a parallel inquiry and they have
never done so. We regard it as of the ubnost importance that this
restraint should continue to be exercised.
The IBJ\. again consulted Counsel. this time their own. who gave as his opinion that
neither of the Foreign Secretary's objections could be sustained. It was confirmed that
Death on the Rock would go out as scheduled.

10. Hansard
1988.

28

April

Around lunchtime. Sir Geoffrey Howe called an impromptu press conference at the
Foreign Office to deplore the IBA's decision. while in the House of Commons that
afternoon. both the Foreign Secretary and Tom King. then Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, referred to the programme as 'trial by television'' 0 , a phrase picked up
and later developed by Mrs Thatcher. Thames Television were astonished by the sudden
furore as no hint of the Foreign Secretary's telephone calls lo the IBA had reached them.
Speaking much later, Richard Dunn. Managtng Director of the company. revealed
another twist in an already complicated story, and one which underlined differences in
opinion within the Cabinet itself:
On the night before Death on the Rock was transmitted. Ian
Tethowen (Chairman of Thames and a former Director General of the
BBC) and I had dinner with Douglas Hurd. the Home Secretary
(among whose responsibilities was broadcasting).
Over dinner. which had been arranged some weeks earlier to discuss
the forthcoming White Paper (on broadcasting), the Home Secretary
told us that he had been telephoned the previous day by the Foreign
Secretary. Sir Geoffrey had explained lhe programme being planned
by Thames and had urged Douglas Hurd to ask the Chairman of the
IBA to postpone its transmission until after the inquest (for which,
incid entally, no date had been set. and wasn't for some months).
Douglas Hurd had told Sir Geoffrey Howe that he would not call the
Chairman of the IBA, and said he did not think it was right for the
government to interfere In programme decisions that were clearly the
responsibility of the IBA.
He asked us if the Authority had been fully and properly consulted.
and whether they had previewed lbe film. When I explained that the
IBA Director of Television and the Director General had already
viewed it. and that the Chairman of the IBA would see it later that
evening he was content. Thames were willing to abide by the final
decision of the lBA. So was the Home Secretary."

11. Speech by Richard
Dunn (1994).

In response to the Foreign Secretary's press briefmg that afternoon, the IBA issued
the following statement:
The IBA considers that the programme is a responsibly made
documentary which assesses and analyses the role of the terrorists
and the SAS in a thorough manner. The lBA has taken advice of
Counsel and has been told that the transmission of the programme
is not in contempt of court. Th e programme makes clear the fu ll
horror of the crimes committed by the IRA terrorists. The even ts of
the Gibraltar shooting have already been the subject of wide
journalistic investigation. The IBA believes that It wo u ld be
6
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unreasonable to deny further reporting of them to television. The IBA
believes that the material in this programme is unlikely to prejudice
the outcome of the inquest. The IBA believes that to postpone the
programme until after an inquest which is still a long way away
would give the IRA more ·oxygen of p~blicity', and would certainly
not prevent it being s hown elsewhere e.g. in Parliament to interested
MPs. or its contents being widely reported.
At 9.00pm that evening. Death on the Rock was transmitted as agreed between
Thames and the IBA. It con tained interviews with five witnesses who had not been
previously interviewed by the Gibraltar police and who threw considerable doubt on Sir
Geoffrey Howe's original statement to the Commons that the terrorists had been shot
'after being challenged'. Among the statements made were a llegations that the three IRA
volunteers had been shot repeatedly by the SAS without warning and that two had tried
to surrender. A former army bomb dis posal expert also said that the security forces
could not have believed that the terrorists' car contained a bomb as such a heavy load
would have been obvious. This contradicted government sources which had suggested
that one of the reasons for the s hooting was that the security forces feared tbal lhe
terroris ts might set off the car bomb by remote control.

Friday, 29 April
In an interview on Japanese television, which was later carried by the BBC and ITN.
Mrs Thatcher whose phrase 'the oxygen of terrorism' had been neatly turned against her
by the IBA, said that her anger over the programme went much deeper than being
'furious'. Arguing that the place for lrial was a court of law, s he added,
Trial by television or guilt by accusation is lhe day that freedom dies. Press
and television rely on freedom. Those who do rely on freedom must have the
duty and responsibility and not try to substitute their own system for it.
Sir Geoffrey Howe also returned to the attack in an interview for The World at One on
BBC radio where he said there could be no justification for the attempt to constitute a
television programme as 'Judge. Jury and Prosecuting Counsel'. It was 'grossly and
wholly Improper'.
In a forthright statement that afternoon, Lord Thomson replied that the government
had ·grossly' over-reacted and described lhe decision to make public the government's
attempts to delay the programme as ·not wise' as their high profile intervention had
resulted in Death on the Rock receiving much more attention. He went on,
The programme would have gone ou t. there would have been a fair degree of
interest in it but the gen eral concern about it would have been a fraction of
what bas now been created. l think there has been a serious and ill-judged
over-reaction ... ! reject absolutely that this is trial by television. It is a normal
piece of journalis m in the face of terrible events. The over-reaction by
Ministers runs not the ri s k of threatening the IBA - that's a secondary
question - but really of undermining something that's Immensely valuable in
terms of the free media. That's what's at issue.
Later on 7 May Professor Michael Zander quoted the Salmon Royal Commission on
contempt before Tribunals (1969) in an article in The Guardian in s upport of the IBA's
decision. He wrote,
Unless it could be shown that the interview was Intended to or was obvious ly
likely to contaminate the evidence, the Salmon Commission said it should not be
contempt to publis h s u ch interviews even a fter t he Tribunal had b een
established. Far from s upporting Mrs Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe, the
Salmon Report therefore demolishes their whole case, for no one could s uggest

7
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that interviews in the 1V programme were obviously likely to contaminate the
evidence... Government will also dertve little comfort from the view of the Salmon
Commission on the value of press comment on such situations. When there Is a
crtsis of public confidence about a matter of nationwide concern, it is very much
In the public interest that there should be complete freedom of discussion for all
- the man In the street. the press. te.levision and radio. To curtail or prohibit free
discussion Is only likely to increase public unease and Is altogether contrary to
our concept of a free society. Moreover, freedom of comment may lead to fresh
factors being brought to light or new theortes being aired which may help the
trtbunal in Its task of arrtving at the truth. We have no doubt but that the solid
. advantages of freedom to comment greatly outweigh the remote risk of the
lribunal being improperly influenced by such comment
While on 9 May Lord Scarman. a former Law Lord in a letter to the The Times of London
wrote,
There is no trial imminent in the United Kingdom which could be prejudiced
by the broadcast. There is no public inquiry set up, or even promised. in the
United Kingdom. The broadcast. therefore. could not be stopped as a contempt
of court or as a threat to any judicial proceeding pending or promised in the
United Kingdom. The rtght to be informed and to comment u'pon matters of
public interest is vital to the workings of a democratic society. Restraint is
justifiable if necessary to prevent prejudice or judicial proceedings which are
imminent. But to extend the restraint to protect proceedings overseas would
have serious implications. It would. for instance, imperil the opportunity, often
the only opportunity. of exposing the victimization of the innocent in many
parts of the world.

Thursday, 5 May
In Northern Ireland only, the BBC screened an edition of their current affairs
programme Spotlight, also investigating the Gibraltar shootings. Again there was strong
reaction from the government. Sir Geoffrey Howe bad telephoned Marmaduke Hussey.
Chairman of the BBC's Board of Governors, the previous morning to seek reassurances
that interviews with new witnesses of the shooting of the three IRA members would nol
be broadcast and making it clear that the government strongly objected to the screening
of any interviews which could 'prejudice' the result of the inquest In a letter he wrote
that evening. he maintained that the broadcast in Northern Ireland would, 'directly
affect the securtty forces of the country'. Despite this government pressure. Spotlight
was transmitted at 8.30pm as scheduled.
Next day, Sir Geoffrey Howe. descrtblng hJmself In
the BBC, went on,

Ute

Commons as a champion of

It does concern me deeply because It did contain the very features about which
I have warned. The interviewing of witnesses, the presentation of their
evidence In interview form in a selective, edited fashion is precisely to
con taminate the evidence and influence unhelpfully the way In which the
Interview wilJ be conducted.' 2 •

12. Hansard 5 May 1988.

Thursday, 12 May
In reply to a letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 4 May and carrying the
salutation 'Dear George', which attempted to give the rationale concer ning the
government's intervention before the transmission of Death on the Rock, Lord Thomson
wrote, 'Dear Geoffrey':
Apart from the importance of avoiding contempt. the issues as we see
them relate to free speech and free enquiry which underpin
8
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individual Uberty in a democracy. The right of broadcasters and the
press to examine events of major public concern is well established
and s hould be preserved. In the last year a lone the enquiries of the
media and their interviews with eye witnesses have helped inform the
public a bou t the circumstances surr~>Und in g such events as the
Zeebrugge ferry disaster, the King's Cross fire. the shootings at
Hungerford, the Remembrance Day massacre at Enniskillen. and the
brutal murders at the Anderstown funeral - a ll of them controversiaL
In all lhese cases inques ts have been held and in some cases public
enquiries have also been set up without any s uggestion that previous
interviews with witnesses on television or in the press have interfered
with the course of justice. '3

13. W indlesham Rampton

Report, pp 136-140.

Outcome
The repercussions of broadcas ting Death on the Rock in the face of the implacable
opposition of Mrs Thatcher and her government were many and are still with us. In
1988. using h is powers under Section 29 of the Broadcasting Act of 1981, which states:
(4) ... The Secretary of State may at any time by notice in writing
require the Authority to re frain from broadcasting any matter or
classes of matter specified In the notice: and it shall be the duty ()f
the Authority to comply with the notice.
and also a s imilar clause (13.4) in the BBC's Licen ce and Agreement 1981. the Home
Secretary introduced a ban on direct Interviews with members of Sinn Fein and other
specified organizations s uch as the IRA. the Irish National Liberation Army, the Ulster
Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom Fighters. This ban was only rescinded in 1994,
a fter the IRA and loya list ceasefrres were announced.
Following the great outcry in parliament and lhe even greater outcry by certain
sections of the press. all of which impugned the integrity of those who had been
inler.viewed and also the programme makers. Thames Television set up an independent
inquiry under Lord Windlesham - a former Tory Leader in the House of Lords and junior
minister in Northern Ireland and Richard Rampton QC a leading and respected lawyer.
Its findings in effect vindicated the broadcast. the company and the IBA. Mrs Thatcher
Immediately rubbis hed the report as s he had rubbis hed the original programme. Writing
much later, Ian Gilmour, a m ember of her frrst cabinet. said :
That effectively was the end of the lTV as it had been known since its
inception in 1955. If Independent Television was not going to do what
it was told. it had to be changed to make it amenable. In a speech to
the Press Association in June 1988, the Prime Minister had
announced that the way forward was more channels becau se 'the
free movement of expression of ideas is guaranteed far better by
numbers and variety than it ever can be by charters and specific
statutes'. Superficially that was odd. s ince th e objective of t he
government had been to inhibit the free expression of ideas on
television, while the charters and statutes to which Mrs Thatcher
objected sought to preserve free expression. But the oddness was
only superficial. A multlplicity of channels as in America, allegedly
providing choice but in reality providing fifty-seven varieties of the
same trivia, would achieve the Thatcherite objective: the neutering of
television as a forum for political ideas independent of the agenda set
by Downing Street. ••

14. Gilmour (1993:257-258).

And so the Broadcasting Act of 1990 r eplaced the Independent Broadcasting
Authority- which as the legal broadcaster had interposed itself between the govemment
of the day and the individual programme company - with the Independent Television
9
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Commission. a licensing body shorn of most of its predecessor's powers and wiUtout the
obligation to educate and inform as well as to entertain. Programme franchises were to
be auctioned to the highest bidder with only a passing acknowledgement of the quality
of programmes they promised to deliver. and in the ensuing scramble Thames
Television . one of the most adventurous producers of programmes in the days of lhe IBA
and incidentally the perpetrator of Death on the Rock. lost its contract to the lack-lustre
Carlton. At the end of his term as Chairman. Lord Thomson was replaced by George
Russell, Chairman and Chief Executive of Marley plc and with a much sounder. in Mrs
Thatcher's eyes. background In business and high finance. He was later knighted. While
the Director General , John Whitney. disappointed at his lack of preferment and
disillusi~ned by the tensions of his office. left the IBA to join Andrew Lloyd Weber's
Really Useful Company. He was succeeded by Shirley Littler. a former career civil
servant who had served in the Home Office and for some time as Deputy Director
General. Finally. and almost as if to disprove the allegations by Sir Geoffrey Howe that
Death on the Rock might contaminate the evidence or unduly influence the outcome of
the Coroner's inquest. on 30 September 1988 the jury of eleven men in Gibraltar after a
nineteen day hearing and a retirement of nearly eight hours. returned a verdict of 'lawful
killing' by a majority of nine to two.
The confrontation between the Thatcher government and the Independent
Broadcasting Authority over the transmission of Death on the Rock led to a major
transformation in the ecology of British Broadcasting - and not one for the better. As
Richard Dunn had said.
There was something about the shrill cry in the White Paper that television
should go to the highest bidder that made it feel as if television bad gone to the
tallest gallows. The Prime Minister had made It plain that if the broadcasters
were not wholly with her. 'supporting our boys·. they were the enemy. It was as
s imple as that. 15

15. Speech by Richard
Dunn (19941.
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